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Latino Immigrant Disadvantage and the Neighborhood Context of Resident Perceptions of and Experiences with Crime and Safety

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ABSTRACT

Most accounts expect neighborhood disadvantage to shape residents' negative experiences, including violence and victimization, in a linear fashion. Yet, the tendency to homogenize poor and (often) ethnoracially segregated communities risks oversimplifying the relationship between disadvantage and resident experiences. We suggest the immigrant revitalization thesis implies a more nuanced, curvilinear association between disadvantage and residents' perceptions of and experiences with neighborhood crime and safety in contexts with high concentrations of Latinos and immigrants. Employing data from the El Paso Neighborhood Study, we find strong associations between disadvantage and the adoption of the code of the street and legal cynicism, perceptions of disorder and crime, and victimization risk. However, this relationship wanes at higher levels of disadvantage. Furthermore, Latino immigrant concentration moderates the association between disadvantage and resident outcomes. Residents in these communities may draw on resilient forms of social capital to mitigate the toll of living in marginalized spaces.

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Scholarship on communities and crime has long emphasized the importance of broader ecological contexts in examining individual outcomes. Sampson and Wilson (1995) warned that failing to account for community context reduces behaviors and perceptions related to crime and safety to solely micro-level phenomena, perpetuating an individualistic fallacy. Nonetheless, contextual research examining the community correlates of individual outcomes remains relatively rare, in part because of the scarcity of community surveys. The few existing multilevel studies often highlight the role of concentrated socioeconomic disadvantage (e.g. high poverty, joblessness, and lower-paying jobs) as among the most powerful contexts shaping resident experiences related to crime and safety (Sampson et al., 2002). Contexts of disadvantage offer cues for residents to employ when perceiving, appraising and making sense of their residential surroundings—what Small (2002) terms neighborhood narrative frames. Scholarship suggests that residents of disadvantaged communities are more likely to

frame their neighborhoods as problematic, contributing to their increased adherence to normative responses that encourage violence, such as the code of the street and legal cynicism (Anderson, 2000; Curry et al., 2025; Kirk & Papachristos, 2017; Stewart & Simons, 2006, 2010), perceptions of community disorder and danger (Sampson & Raudenbush, 2004), and the risk of offending and victimization (Elliott et al., 1996; Peeples & Loeber, 1994; Wilcox et al., 2018).

The entrenched racial structure in the U.S. translates into substantial ethnoracial inequality in exposure to the corrosive consequences of neighborhood disadvantage, making it often difficult to disentangle the independent effects of ethnoracial composition and disadvantage empirically (Krivo et al., 2021; McNulty, 2001; Peterson & Krivo, 2010; Sampson & Wilson, 1995). Not only are Blacks and Latinos more likely than Whites to live in neighborhoods with fewer resources, but majority non-White communities also have much greater concentrations of socioeconomic disadvantages than majority White communities (Krivo et al., 2021). According to predominant social disorganization perspectives, the stark reality of ethnoracial spatial inequality in community opportunities and resources implies that segregated non-White communities likely have lower levels of community social organization and other forms of social capital that reduce their ability to control crime (Almeida et al., 2009; Sampson et al., 1997).

Ample theoretical foundation expects concentrated disadvantage to adversely influence residents' perceptions of and experiences with neighborhood crime and safety. However, research on racially segregated communities suggests there is more nuance to the relationship than some studies have implied (Duck, 2015; Moore & Pinderhughes, 1993; Pattillo, 1998; Small, 2002). Pushing back against one-dimensional views of segregated and economically marginalized places, ethnographers contend that some of these communities exhibit resilient forms of social capital that counter marginalization (Duck, 2015; Small, 2002). While research in this vein certainly does not argue against the deleterious forces of structural inequality and socioeconomic disadvantage, it warns that painting segregated non-White communities as "disorganized" risks missing the ways residents from these communities work to resist marginalization. In turn, this essentializing may lead to criminalizing extremely disadvantaged and segregated places (Martinez, 2014; Molina, 2022; Rios, 2011).

Research on Latino immigrant communities provides a similar corrective to the tendency to homogenize the experiences of economically marginalized communities of color. The immigrant revitalization thesis hinges on the resilience of poor and segregated Latino immigrant communities (Aranda et al., 2011; Browning et al., 2016; Eschbach et al., 2004; Lara, 2018; Lee, 2013; Lee & Martinez, 2002; Martinez, 2014; Sandoval-Strausz, 2019). Proponents of the thesis argue that the concentration of Latinos and immigrants often means residents share a variety of cultural, social and historical experiences that build trust, ties, and mutual expectations about how to frame, navigate and act on behalf of their neighborhood (Browning et al., 2016; Curry et al., 2025; Lee & Martinez, 2002). Moreover, scholars point to how Latino immigrants build social capital by using public spaces to support and improve the ways residents interact with other residents and institutions, embedding themselves in practices and routines of sociability, populating distressed areas, and replenishing their ethnic identity through continued immigration and participation in cultural activities and

institutions (Lara, 2018; Sandoval-Strausz, 2019). We argue that this backdrop of fortified social capital likely translates into resiliencies that help residents counterbalance their negative frames to more optimistic, or at least less unfavorable, ones whereby residents perceive fewer problems despite the realities of economic marginalization.

We build on the immigrant revitalization thesis to explore whether large concentrations of Latinos and immigrants undercut the toll of disadvantage experienced by residents in El Paso, TX. Socioeconomic disadvantage is highly correlated with the concentration of Latinos and the foreign born in El Paso, a predominantly Latino city with a sizeable immigrant population that sits along the southern border with Mexico. The revitalization thesis anticipates that residents in extremely disadvantaged places with high concentrations of Latino immigrants may be able to draw on robust forms of social capital to offset some of the negative consequences of economic marginalization. To assess this claim, we employ the El Paso Neighborhood Study (EPNS), which provides an array of rich information for about 900 respondents residing in 46 neighborhood clusters in 2014 (Curry et al., 2014). These data allow us to conduct contextual analyses that tie individual's perceptions of and experiences with neighborhood crime and safety to neighborhood conditions, particularly levels of disadvantage and Latino immigration.

Prior work implies a linear association between neighborhood disadvantage and resident's perceptions of and experiences with neighborhood crime and safety. In El Paso, we expect respondents who reside in areas with higher levels of concentrated disadvantage to more likely espouse the code of the street, express legal cynicism, perceive their communities as disordered and less safe, and experience more victimization. However, drawing on the immigrant revitalization thesis, we suspect the relationship between these outcomes and disadvantage to be more nuanced than previous work has suggested. We contend that the immigrant revitalization thesis implies two related forms of nonlinearity. First, we expect a positive but decelerating relationship between disadvantage and resident perceptions of crime and safety whereby the risk of living in a disadvantaged community will lessen in contexts dominated by Latinos and immigrants. Second, we also expect a related form of nonlinearity in which Latino immigrant composition mitigates the influence of disadvantage on the resident outcomes we examine.

The Context of Disadvantage

The conceptualization of concentrated disadvantage as corrosive for communities and individuals stems largely from Wilson's (1987, 1996) foundational work. Wilson (1987, 1996) documents the plight of urban poor neighborhoods characterized by high poverty (i.e. levels that exceed 40%), and a host of other forms of socioeconomic marginalization, such as the widespread presence of single-parent families and male joblessness. These disadvantages concentrate in geographic space, yielding acute levels of social isolation, which Wilson (1996) defines as the lack of "contact or sustained interaction with institutions, families, and individuals that represent mainstream society" (p. 64). Socially isolated contexts undermine social and institutional processes that buoy community and resident wellbeing. For example, scholars point to a dearth of community organizations and institutions, patterns of disinvestment, limited social

interaction with people who have resources to improve or at least navigate the harsh structural reality of isolation, and coping skills fueled by fear and mistrust that undermine collective behavior (Elder et al., 2024; Rankin & Quane, 2000; Sampson et al., 2002; Wilson, 1987). Wilson and others draw on social disorganization theory to foreground disadvantage and subsequent social isolation as impeding the ability of communities to organize against crime and/or counteract cognitive frameworks that encourage crime (Kirk & Papachristos, 2017; Sampson, 2012; Sampson & Wilson, 1995). Relevant to our contextual study, this literature suggests that residents draw cues from these isolated contexts and frame their neighborhoods as undesirable, which in turn leads to less commitment and investment in their communities among many residents (Sampson et al., 2002).

Wilson's treatise galvanized a significant amount of research tracing disadvantage to a variety of neighborhood level outcomes, most especially crime (Chamberlain & Hipp, 2015; Hipp & Yates, 2011; Krivo et al., 2021; Krivo & Peterson, 1996; Peterson & Krivo, 2010; Sampson et al., 2002). Almost the entirety of scholarship on disadvantage and crime-related outcomes takes place at the macro-level. This between-neighborhood focus masks important heterogeneity within neighborhoods. Consequently, we know less about how residents within the same disadvantaged context respond and make sense of their surroundings.

By embedding individuals within their neighborhoods, a smaller body of research seeks to understand how residents interpret jointly experienced conditions. These studies connect living in contexts of disadvantage with a wide range of challenges for individuals, including lower health and wellbeing, barriers to educational and occupational attainment, and suppressed political participation (Elder et al., 2024; Ross & Mirowsky, 2001; Sampson et al., 2002). Although data scarcity limits how much we know about the contextual antecedents of resident perceptions of and experiences with neighborhood crime and safety, a small number of studies emphasize the importance of disadvantage in shaping the code of the street and legal cynicism, perceptions of community disorder and safety, as well as victimization experiences. We review this work below.

The Code of the Street and Legal Cynicism

Neighborhood disadvantage increases normative frameworks that encourage responses that in some cases elicit crime and/or discourage trust in the criminal legal system. Two forms of normative adaptations have been studied the most: the code of the street and legal cynicism. According to Anderson (2000), the code of the street refers to a set of informal rules that govern interpersonal contact, including attitudes and beliefs that favor toughness, aggressiveness, respect, and a willingness to resort to violence as a strategy for campaigning for respect (Matsueda et al., 2006). Anderson (2000) theorizes that the code of the street arises from a profound sense of alienation from the criminal legal system and is most likely to occur in disadvantaged communities. Individuals residing in disadvantaged neighborhoods report higher adherence to the code of the street (Curry et al., 2025; Intravia et al., 2014; Stewart & Simons, 2006, 2010). Moreover, the code of the street may mediate the relationship between neighborhood disadvantage and violent delinquency (Stewart & Simons, 2010). Legal

cynicism generally refers to residents' moral alignment with the law and can be captured with residents' normative support for law violations, including the degree to which residents think "laws were made to be broken" or "there is no right or wrong way to make money" (Curry et al., 2014). Sampson and Bartusch (1998) find that concentrated disadvantage increases respondent's legal cynicism in Chicago neighborhoods. Moreover, Kirk et al. (2012) find that residents of disadvantaged neighborhoods are more cynical of the law than residents in more affluent communities across New York City.¹

Perceptions of Disorder and Safety

Concentrated disadvantage may increase residents' perceptions of neighborhood disorder and safety at least in part by degrading the built environment through the prevalence of vacant lots or abandoned housing, increasing unwanted street activity, and undermining the ability of communities to organize against these issues (Sampson & Raudenbush, 2004). Research finds that residents who live in disadvantaged communities perceive higher levels of social disorder (e.g. loitering and drinking on the street, fights in public spaces) and physical disorder (e.g. trash on the streets and signs of gang activity with graffiti) (Sampson & Raudenbush, 2004). In fact, Sampson and Raudenbush (2004) find that "concentrated disadvantage is the single most important predictor of disorder in Chicago neighborhoods" (p. 625). In terms of perceptions of community safety, Sampson et al. (1997) find that residents of disadvantaged neighborhoods were more likely to see their neighborhoods as violent in Chicago. In some of the few studies to explore these questions outside of Chicago, Holmes, (2003) finds that concentrated Latino disadvantage increases perceptions of victimization risk in El Paso, and Curry et al. (2025) find that residents perceive more crime as their level of neighborhood disadvantage increases in El Paso.

Offending and Victimization

Scholars draw principally on social disorganization and routine activities to understand how disadvantage shapes the risk for offending and victimization for residents, although studies rarely test the theorized intervening mechanisms directly. Concentrated disadvantage robustly predicts the risk of victimization and offending (De Coster et al., 2006; Elliott et al., 1996; Lauritsen & White, 2001; Peeples & Loeber, 1994; Sampson et al., 1997; Xie & Baumer, 2018). Sampson et al. (1997) find that individuals report an increased risk of victimization when living in disadvantaged neighborhoods in Chicago, largely because of lower levels of collective efficacy. Recently, White et al. (2022) link a measure of concentrated disadvantage to significant increases in the

¹With the criminal legal system in mind, Kirk and Papachristos (2017) refine the concept of legal cynicism "as a cultural orientation in which the law and the agents of its enforcement, such as the police and courts, are viewed as illegitimate, unresponsive, and ill equipped to ensure public safety" (Kirk and Papachristos 2017, p. 1191) find that disadvantage promotes this form of legal cynicism for residents living in Chicago neighborhoods.

likelihood of violent victimization in street segments in Baltimore. Other work documents that youth who reside in disadvantaged neighborhoods report more involvement in criminal behavior and violence (Bellair et al., 2024; Bellair & McNulty, 2005; McNulty & Bellair, 2003).

The Functional Form of Disadvantage, Resident Outcomes, and Immigrant Revitalization

Despite highlighting the role that socioeconomic disadvantage plays in shaping residents' perceptions of and experiences with neighborhood crime and safety, to the best of our knowledge, none of the contextual studies noted above test for nonlinearity in the influence of disadvantage or for the ability of Latino immigrant concentration to mitigate the impact of disadvantage. Existing research thus implies a linear relationship in which neighborhood disadvantage increases the odds of deleterious outcomes for residents in a uniform fashion across its distribution.

We suspect, however, that the association between disadvantage and resident perceptions of and experiences with neighborhood crime and safety may not always be linear. In particular, the underlining logic of the immigrant revitalization thesis and attendant research on Latino immigrant communities leads us to expect two forms of nonlinearity: (1) the association between disadvantage and resident outcomes wanes at high levels of disadvantage; and (2) a statistical interaction whereby concentrated Latino immigration moderates the relationship between disadvantage and resident outcomes.

The core idea of the immigrant revitalization thesis is that immigrants, especially those who share a common language and history of settlement, engage in a variety of practices that strengthen community social organization, and thereby revitalize communities (Browning et al., 2016; Lee, 2013; Lee & Martinez, 2002). The consequence of such revitalization means that communities and their residents might be better off than expected given high levels of socioeconomic deprivation. That is, these contexts stimulate social interactions and social exchanges that yield frames and strategies to cushion some of the consequences of disadvantage (Browning et al., 2016; Cagney et al., 2007; Eschbach et al., 2004; Small, 2006). The thesis also anticipates that revitalization is most likely to happen in contexts where disadvantage is coupled with robust concentrations of Latinos and immigrants (Vélez & Lyons, 2012).

A small number of studies document the community dynamics related to revitalization. Sandoval-Strausz (2019) points to the use of public spaces by residents of poor Latino immigrant neighborhoods, or "*barrios*", that encourage day-to-day sociability. In particular, he documents that in Chicago and Dallas *barrios*, residents are more likely to walk than drive to complete errands and interact with neighbors while watching children play in the front yard. Part of this vibrant street life includes street vendors that sell food and wares. In addition, continuous influxes of immigrants into geographically concentrated areas help residents retain their home country's cultural identities and language (i.e. enculturation), replenish and strengthen ties with co-ethnics and sustain an ethnic core (Curry et al., 2025; Telles and Sue, 2019). A replenishing population also bolsters institutions that serve as hubs for information sharing, building social ties, and fueling ethnic pride, identity, and community

attachment (Sandoval, 2021; Sandoval and Herrera, 2015). We argue that the immigrant revitalization thesis implies a diminishing positive relationship between disadvantage and various resident outcomes. Specifically, in areas with substantial Latino immigration, the thesis suggests the association between disadvantage and resident outcomes begins to wane at high levels of disadvantage. In ethnoracially segregated contexts such as El Paso, where disadvantage correlates strongly with Latino immigrant concentration, a fertile backdrop for revitalization may mitigate some of the deleterious consequences of economic marginalization for residents. Another way to conceptualize this nonlinear association is through a statistical interaction whereby Latino immigration moderates the relationship between disadvantage and resident outcomes.

Although studies document the protective benefits of living in areas with more immigrants, we are not aware of any studies that test either the functional form of disadvantage in places with large Latino immigrant populations or whether immigration attenuates the consequences of disadvantage for residents.² A handful of adjacent studies, however, are instructive. Xie and Baumer (2018) find that immigration is the most protective against victimization risk when it reaches high levels and takes place in areas with long histories of victimization.³ A paper by Browning et al. (2016) finds that, net of disadvantage, relatively high levels of Latino immigrant concentration lead to high levels of perceptions and agreement about collective efficacy, whereas in neighborhoods with limited Latino immigration there are lower levels of collective efficacy both in terms of perceptions and agreement.⁴ They reason that once the Latino immigrant population reaches a threshold, it creates a context for bolstering community social organization by invigorating robust social support networks, strengthening “integrating institutions with resources”, encouraging shared use of public spaces in the community, and thereby developing trust and prosocial frameworks (Browning et al., 2016, p. 784). Further, they contend that such benefits spill into the community for all residents not just those who are Latino or foreign born. Based on the El Paso Neighborhood Study (the survey used in our analyses), Curry et al. (2025) find that living in immigrant dense neighborhoods strengthens residents’ ties to their home country (Mexico), and such enculturation serves as a protective factor against victimization risk.

Regarding tests for whether Latino immigration moderates the influence of disadvantage on resident outcomes related to crime, we know of only one study that explores this form of nonlinearity in a contextual framework. Kirk et al. (2012) find that living

²In a macro (neighborhood level) analysis of disadvantage and crime, Hipp and Yates (2011) report across 25 cities that poverty increases neighborhood violent and property crime, but the relationship levels off once poverty reaches a relatively high threshold. Although this study focuses on neighborhood rather than resident outcomes, it is one of the few to explore the functional form of disadvantage for crime.

³Note that when Xie and Baumer (2018) disaggregate by the race/ethnicity of the respondent the nonlinear relationships become more complicated. Specifically, they find that compared to Whites and Blacks, Latinos benefit the most from immigration. However, immigrant concentration loses its protective influence in neighborhoods where immigrants make up close to the majority of residents.

⁴Xie and Baumer (2019) find a nonlinear relationship between percent foreign born and reporting victimization to the police in non-traditional destination counties such that residents are less likely to report their victimization to the police as immigration reaches high levels. In traditional immigrant counties, however, percent foreign born has no discernable influence on reporting a victimization to the police.

in neighborhoods with more immigrants leads to residents reporting less legal cynicism and greater likelihood of reporting their victimization to the police. Kirk et al. (2012) find no evidence that the relationship between neighborhood immigration and residents' legal cynicism depends on neighborhood poverty. Other studies that test the interaction between immigration and disadvantage focus on neighborhood crime rates and not individual (resident) outcomes. Vélez and Lyons (2012) find that immigration helps offset the deleterious consequences of disadvantage on neighborhood violence across 69 cities. In a study of Chicago neighborhoods, Velez, (2009) tests for a statistical interaction between neighborhood levels of disadvantage and recent immigrants and finds that immigration lessens the influence of disadvantage on homicide (see also Proffitt, 2025). In contrast, although not a central component of their analyses, Kubrin et al. (2025) find that the influence of immigrant concentration on neighborhood levels of violent and property crime does not depend on disadvantage.

Most of the work reviewed above uncovers the benefits of immigration for neighborhoods as well as residents. At the macro level, immigration appears to buffer the deleterious consequences of disadvantage in ways that keep crime at bay. Although a handful of contextual studies tie neighborhood immigration to benefits for residents in terms of victimization risk, legal cynicism, and collective efficacy, few examine the resident outcomes we consider, and fewer still explore potential nonlinearities in the influence of disadvantage on resident perceptions and experiences. Nonetheless, our overall read of existing research on immigrant revitalization leads us to expect that disadvantage will negatively affect the outcomes for residents we examine. However, we anticipate that the association will be nonlinear in a place like El Paso, where the strong correlation between socioeconomic marginalization and Latino immigration allows for countervailing revitalization processes that can soften the consequences of disadvantage.

Alternative Possibilities

Some neighborhood-level studies suggest alternative forms of nonlinearity in which the perils of economic disadvantage accelerate at high levels. This possibility derives from Wilson's own emphasis on the "exceptional" social milieu of extremely disadvantaged places. In now a classic assessment of this idea at the neighborhood-level in Columbus OH, Krivo and Peterson (1996) find evidence of a quadratic form for disadvantage in which neighborhoods at the extreme ends of the distribution have substantially more violent and property crime than communities with high or low levels of disadvantage. Krivo and Peterson (1996) conclude that "these qualitatively distinct features of the social environment led to unusually high levels of crime" (p. 620). In another neighborhood level study, Hipp and Yates (2011) also find evidence of nonlinearity whereby extreme levels of poverty lead to especially high levels of neighborhood homicide across numerous cities.⁵ Whether these patterns found at

⁵Kubrin et al. (2025) find that neighborhood immigration levels conform to a positive accelerating functional form for violent crime such that violent crime begins to increase when the population reaches about 40%, appearing like a U-shaped curve.

the neighborhood level correspond to outcomes for residents living in disadvantaged neighborhoods is less clear. Despite the currency of Wilson's conceptualization of the unique social milieu of extremely disadvantaged places, we found no studies in the communities and crime literature that test for a positive accelerating functional form within a contextual framework that embeds residents within their neighborhoods.

Current Study

The broad goal of this paper is to test the association between disadvantage and residents' perceptions of and experiences with crime and safety. We expect that residents living in economically disadvantaged neighborhoods will experience more risk. However, drawing on the immigrant revitalization thesis, we expect a "barrio advantage" (Eschbach et al., 2004, p. 1810) in disadvantaged areas with more Latino immigrants that will help residents frame their communities less negatively, even in economically marginalized communities. As Small (2002) argues, residents adopt frames "that highlight certain aspects of the neighborhood and ignore others"; they do not just see the neighborhood "as it is" but how they wish to see it (p. 22). In this case, we posit that residents in poor Latino immigrant communities can draw on these resiliencies to "see" the neighborhood more favorably despite living in an area with concentrated disadvantage. Research on immigrant revitalization leads us to assess two forms on nonlinearity in the relationship between disadvantage and resident outcomes. First, we test the functional form of the relationship between disadvantage and residents' perceptions of and experiences with neighborhood crime and safety. As we explain below, the high correlation between economic conditions and Latino immigration in El Paso present some challenges to our ability to isolate the effects of ethnoracial composition from disadvantage. We take several steps to address these issues, including exploring a ten-item index of Latino immigrant disadvantage that combines highly correlated elements. Second, we assess whether Latino immigrant composition moderates the influence of disadvantage on our six individual-level outcomes.

Data and Methods

We employ two data sources: the El Paso Neighborhood Study (EPNS) (ICPSR 38246; Curry et al., 2014) and 5-year estimates of the American Community Survey (2012–2016). Modeled after the community survey from the Project on Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods, the gold standard for tracking residents' experiences within neighborhoods, the EPNS provides survey data for a random sample of adults drawn from 46 neighborhood clusters (what we refer to as neighborhoods) in El Paso County, Texas.⁶ After adjusting for missingness in our dependent variables as well as age and

⁶See Curry et al. (2014) for details on the sampling frame used to identify the clusters and survey respondents for the EPNS. These 46 clusters and their residents are considered representative of the broader El Paso County area.

years living in the home, the final analytical sample is 938 surveys of residents across 46 neighborhood clusters. In our analytic sample, the average neighborhood has about 20 respondents, and this ranges from 12 to 30 respondents.

The context of El Paso is noteworthy. A border community with Mexico, El Paso is a predominantly Latino (Mexican origin) city/county with a relatively large documented and undocumented immigrant population. El Paso has robust cooperation between local law and immigration enforcement officials (e.g. Secure Communities)⁷ and is a relatively safe city (Curry et al., 2025).

Dependent Variables – Individual Level

We examine six dependent variables to gauge residents' perceptions of and experiences with neighborhood crime and safety from the EPNS. First, adherence to the code of the street indicates the level of agreement on a 5 point Likert scale (1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Neither Agree nor Disagree, 4 = Agree, 5 = Strongly Agree) with ten items: (1) teenagers and young adults in your neighborhood must be willing to fight to gain respect among their peers; (2) parents in your neighborhood teach their kids to fight back if they are insulted or threatened; (3) people in your neighborhood will seek revenge even if it means resorting to violence if a loved one is disrespected; (4) young men in your neighborhood try to act tough; (5) young women in your neighborhood try to act tough; (6) young men in your neighborhood who own guns or other weapons are often looked up to and respected by others; (7) young women in your neighborhood who own guns or other weapons are often looked up to and respected by others; (8) people in your neighborhood do not respect a young man who is afraid to fight physically; (9) people in your neighborhood do not respect a young woman who is afraid to fight physically; and (10) in your neighborhood, it is important to show others that a person cannot be intimidated (alpha = 0.90).

Second, modeled after the items from the PHDCN, we measure legal cynicism with responses to the following statements indicating moral alignment with law-abiding behavior (1=Strongly Disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Neither Agree nor Disagree, 4=Agree, 5=Strongly Agree): (1) laws were made to be broken; (2) it's okay to do anything you want as long as you don't hurt anyone; (3) to make money, there are no right and wrong ways anymore, only easy ways and hard ways; (4) fighting between friends or within families is nobody else's business; and (5) nowadays a person has to live pretty much for today and let tomorrow take care of itself (alpha = 0.72).

Third, social disorder taps into respondents' views on how much of a problem (1=Not a Problem, 2=Somewhat of a Problem, 3=A Big Problem) the following issues are in their neighborhood: alcohol consumption, drug use, people making threats to others, people being rowdy, loud music from cars or homes, other types of noise by neighbors, people hanging out in streets; people begging or asking for money, people bother or causing problems (alpha = 0.87). Fourth, physical disorder uses the same

⁷<https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/ice-secure-communities-program-now-activated-all-texas-counties>.

metric but focuses on perceptions of the destruction of property and vandalism, graffiti, litter or trash, and poorly maintained housing ($\alpha = 0.77$).

Fifth, to measure perceptions of neighborhood crime, respondents reported how often they thought certain events happened in their neighborhood in the last 12 months (1=Not Happened, 2=Happened Once, 3=Happened More Than Once): a violent argument between neighbors; gang fight; a sexual assault or rape; robbery; auto theft or some other type of theft; a burglary; or any other type of crime.

Sixth, violent victimization indicates whether respondents reported ever experiencing the threat or use of violence against them near their home or neighborhood by a non-family member (1=yes; 0=no).

Key Independent Variables – Neighborhood Level

We measure socioeconomic disadvantage with an index of six items using ACS data: (1) % female headed households; (2) % living below poverty line; (3) % employed in secondary sector employment; (4) % not in the labor force and unemployed (jobless); (5) percent professionals and employment (reverse-coded); and (6) % high school graduates ($\alpha = 0.91$). Items for the scale are converted to z-scores and averaged. The high-level alpha indicates that these items work well together in an index.

Following Sampson et al. (1997) and Browning et al. (2016), we measure Latino immigration concentration with an index of four items using ACS data: (1) % foreign-born; (2) % recent foreign-born; (3) % of households that are limited English speaking (linguistic isolation); and (4) % Latino. Items for the scale are converted to z-scores and averaged, showing a robust alpha level ($\alpha = 0.79$).

Given the strong correlation between socioeconomic disadvantage and Latino immigrant concentration across El Paso neighborhoods ($r=0.85$, $p < .05$), we also create an index that combines disadvantage and Latino immigration into a component called Latino immigrant disadvantage. The index consolidates ten highly correlated elements: (1) % female headed households; (2) % living below poverty line; (3) % employed in secondary sector employment; (4) % not in the labor force and unemployed (jobless); (5) percent professionals and managers (reverse-coded); (6) % high school graduates; (7) % foreign-born; (8) % recent foreign-born; (9) % linguistic isolation; and (10) % Latino. Items for the scale are converted to z-scores and averaged. The high-level alpha (0.94) indicates that these items work well together in an index.

Controls

Individual Level

We utilize survey items on the nativity of respondents and their mothers to determine immigrant generational status. First-generation immigrants include any respondents born outside of the United States. Second-generation immigrants include respondents who were born in the U.S. but whose mother was born outside of the U.S. Third generation (or greater) individuals were born in the U.S. with mothers also born in the U.S. (the reference category). We control for respondents' race with three mutually exclusive categories: Latinos, Whites (the reference category) and others. We adjust

for respondents' age in years, self-reported gender (female = 1; male = 0), years living in the current home, current employment status (1=yes), and whether a respondent lives alone or not. Finally, we control for border crossing, a binary variable indicating whether the respondent or any current member of the respondent's household has crossed the border to visit Juarez or any other place in Mexico in the last twelve months (0=no, 1=yes).

Neighborhood Level

Following Peterson and Krivo (2010), we adjust for residential instability with an index that standardizes and sums the percentage of renters and those who moved in the past five years ($\alpha = 0.55$). We also adjust for the percentage of young males (15–34) in the population.

Analytic Strategy

The EPNS nests individuals within neighborhoods. An important methodological concern with nested data is the potential for dependence or clustering among observations within the same group. To gauge whether multilevel modeling is necessary to deal with interdependence within level 2 units, we calculate the intraclass correlation (ICC) based on findings from unconditional, random intercept models for each of the dependent variables (Snijders & Bosker, 1999). For our analytic sample, we find that the ICCs are low, ranging from 0.011 to 0.081. Furthermore, in four of our six dependent variables, likelihood ratio tests comparing two-level to conventional single-level models indicate preference for the conventional model (see Appendix Tables A1–A3). Finally, results from single-level models with standard errors that adjust for clustering are generally consistent with random intercept models (see appendix Tables A1–A3). These findings indicate little need for multi-level modeling. We thus report single-level models with standard errors that adjust for clustering across neighborhoods. For our five continuous outcomes—code of the street, legal cynicism, social disorder, physical disorder, and perceived neighborhood crime—we utilize OLS regression models, and for our one dichotomous outcome variable—victimization risk—we use logistic regression. We also assessed multicollinearity among our variables across our models by examining bivariate correlations and Variance Inflation Factors. Concerns for high correlations among socioeconomic disadvantage and concentrated Latino immigration shape our multi-stage approach to answer our research questions.

Findings

Summary Statistics

Table 1 provides summary statistics for our dependent and independent variables. Generally, statistics for the dependent variables are consistent with the relative safety of El Paso. Respondents report low average support for the code of the street and legal cynicism. Perceptions of disorder are also quite limited in that the typical respondent disagreed with the idea that physical and social incivilities, such as loitering or

Table 1. Descriptives ($n=938$ for individuals and $n=46$ for neighborhoods).

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Dependent Variables				
Code of the Street	23.71	7.37	10	48
Legal cynicism	12.45	3.84	5	25
Social Disorder	11.70	3.46	9	27
Physical Disorder	5.21	1.76	4	12
Perceived neighborhood crime	9.56	2.36	8	22
Violent Victimization (1 = yes)	0.07	...	0	1
Neighborhood (N=46)				
Independent Variables				
<i>Socioeconomic Disadvantage</i>	-0.01	0.88	-1.59	1.97
-- % Female-Headed Households	19.81	5.80	6.05	31.38
-- % Poverty	24.47	14.91	3.98	62.24
-- % Secondary sector emp.	22.10	9.25	8.74	54.56
-- % Jobless	36.91	7.33	24.68	61.11
-- % Professionals and managers	27.47	13.00	6.00	57.87
-- % High School Graduates	72.88	16.66	31.97	96.68
<i>Latino Immigrant Concentration</i>	-0.01	0.86	-1.71	1.94
-- % Foreign Born	26.86	8.63	10.43	48.46
-- % Recent immigrants	8.05	4.04	2.15	21.17
-- % Linguistic Isolation	25.11	17.32	5.08	65.28
-- % Latino	83.55	15.38	43.82	99.86
<i>Latino Immigrant Disadvantage</i>	-0.01	0.49	-0.90	1.12
Controls				
Neighborhood (N=46)				
Residential Instability	-0.05	0.90	-0.98	3.19
-- % renters	36.31	19.81	13.56	87.87
-- % movers	12.75	6.61	4.96	40.42
% Young males	15.28	2.83	11.82	25.61
Individual level (N=938)				
1st generation (1 = yes)	0.27	...	0	1
2nd generation (1 = yes)	0.27	...	0	1
3rd generation (1 = yes)	0.46	...	0	1
non-Hispanic White (1 = yes)	0.13	...	0	1
Latino (1 = yes)	0.82	...	0	1
other (1 = yes)	0.06	...	0	1
age (years)	42.13	16.86	14	85
female (1 = yes)	0.56	...	0	1
years living at home (years)	12.36	11.77	0	65
employed (1 = yes)	0.49	...	0	1
live alone (1 = yes)	0.08	...	0	1
border crossing (1 = yes)	0.41	...	0	1

trash, were a big problem in their neighborhoods. The typical respondent perceived little neighborhood crime, and about 7% of respondents reported experiencing violent victimization.

Turning to our measures of socioeconomic disadvantage and Latino immigrant concentration, respondents live in disadvantaged places. For example, the typical respondent's neighborhood has high levels of female headed households (20%), poverty (25%), and male joblessness (37%). The typical respondent lives in a community that is heavily Latino (84%) with large shares of immigrants (27%) and a sizable number that recently arrived (8%) and are linguistically isolated (25%). Table 1 also shows that El Paso is heavily Latino—the average neighborhood in our sample is 84% Latino with a range from 44% to 100%.

Respondents in our sample, on average, are 42 years old and likely to be Latino (over 80% identified themselves as Hispanic). The gender distribution favors female respondents (56%). These neighborhoods have some residential instability with an average of 36% renters and about 13% of residents that have moved in the last 5 years. In the average neighborhood, about 15% of residents are young males.

Analyses

We begin with a test of the functional form of socioeconomic disadvantage on our individual level outcomes in [Table 2](#). The first models of outcomes A through F include a linear term for disadvantage. For five of the six outcomes, we find a positive and significant influence of disadvantage. The influence of disadvantage on victimization risk is marginally significant (see Model 1F).

Model 2 (A–F) adds in a quadratic function for disadvantage. These models provide evidence of nonlinearity whereby disadvantage increases the likelihood of our six outcomes but with a diminishing slope at high levels. Across all outcomes, nonlinear models support our expectation of a positive but decelerating association between disadvantage and resident perception of crime and safety.

To help visualize the curvilinear nature of neighborhood disadvantage, we graph margin plots for code of the street, legal cynicism, perceptions of social and physical disorder and crime, and victimization risk below in [Figures 1–6](#). To facilitate interpretation, we assess the margin plots at each decile of disadvantage. [Table 3](#) provides the corresponding descriptives for each decile of the components of the six-item index of disadvantage. For example, at the 5th decile of disadvantage, the corresponding levels of poverty, female headed families, and joblessness are 23, 21, and 35%, respectively. We also compute the marginal effect of disadvantage at each decile to determine the sign and significance of the slope.

[Figure 1](#) clearly shows a positive decelerating association between disadvantage and adherence to the code of the street. Residents experience an increased risk of adhering to the code of the street beginning at the 1st to about the 6th decile, after which adherence begins to wane. Indeed, the marginal effects show that the influence of disadvantage on code of the street is not significant beginning at the 7th decile.

[Figures 2–6](#) visualize the nonlinear influence of disadvantage on legal cynicism, perceptions of social and physical disorder and neighborhood crime, and victimization risk, respectively. These figures reveal patterns similar to [Figure 1](#): respondent's perceptions of and experiences with neighborhood crime and safety increase as disadvantage increases. However, for legal cynicism and social and physical disorder, at the 8th decile, the relationship between disadvantage and these outcomes lessens and the slopes lose statistical significance. For perceptions of neighborhood crime and victimization risk, disadvantage loses its corrosive impact at the 6th decile of disadvantage. For victimization risk, the slope at the 9th decile is negative and marginally significant ($p < .10$).

Table 2. Neighborhood disadvantage (linear and quadratic) on resident's perceptions of and experiences with neighborhood crime and safety ($N=938$).

Variables	Code of the street			Legal cynicism			Social disorder			Physical disorder			Perceived Neigh. crime			Victimization risk		
	Model 1a	Model 2a	Model 1b	Model 2b	Model 1c	Model 2c	Model 1d	Model 2d	Model 1e	Model 2e	Model 1f	Model 2f	Model 1g	Model 2g	Model 1h	Model 2h	Model 1i	Model 2i
	b	(SE)	b	(SE)	b	(SE)	b	(SE)	b	(SE)	b	(SE)	b	(SE)	b	(SE)	b	(SE)
Neighborhood Level																		
Neighborhood Disadvantage	1.75*** (0.44)	1.92*** (0.35)	0.83** (0.22)	0.88*** (0.21)	0.79*** (0.16)	0.86*** (0.12)	0.33*** (0.07)	0.35*** (0.12)	0.28* (0.11)	0.31*** (0.10)	0.31* (0.16)	0.40* (0.20)	0.31*** (0.11)	0.31*** (0.10)	0.31* (0.16)	0.40* (0.20)	0.31*** (0.11)	0.31*** (0.10)
Neigh. Dis. squared	...	-1.17** (0.41)	...	-0.32* (0.16)	...	-0.50*** (0.11)	...	-0.16*** (0.05)	...	-0.18* (0.08)	...	-0.49* (0.20)	...	-0.18* (0.08)	...	-0.49* (0.20)	...	-0.18* (0.08)
Residential Stability Index	-0.38 (0.43)	0.02 (0.31)	-0.43* (0.20)	-0.32 (0.19)	0.23* (0.15)	0.40** (0.12)	-0.07 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.05)	0.00 (0.11)	0.06 (0.12)	-0.26 (0.24)	-0.12 (0.26)	0.00 (0.11)	0.06 (0.12)	-0.26 (0.24)	-0.12 (0.26)	0.00 (0.11)	0.06 (0.12)
Percent Males Aged 15-34	0.00 (0.11)	-0.14 (0.11)	0.06 (0.06)	0.02 (0.06)	-0.12 (0.05)	-0.18*** (0.04)	0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.10* (0.06)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.10* (0.06)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.04)
Individual Level																		
Generation (ref. Third Gen.)																		
First Gen	-0.28 (0.75)	-0.33 (0.73)	-0.27 (0.34)	-0.28 (0.35)	0.05 (0.33)	0.03 (0.32)	0.22 (0.15)	0.22 (0.15)	-0.04 (0.19)	-0.05 (0.19)	-0.74* (0.37)	-0.74* (0.36)	-0.04 (0.19)	-0.05 (0.19)	-0.74* (0.37)	-0.74* (0.36)	-0.04 (0.19)	-0.05 (0.19)
Second Gen	0.53 (0.67)	0.39 (0.65)	0.06 (0.36)	0.02 (0.36)	0.69* (0.33)	0.63* (0.32)	0.44** (0.16)	0.42* (0.16)	0.56* (0.25)	0.54* (0.24)	-0.11 (0.24)	-0.15 (0.24)	0.56* (0.25)	0.54* (0.24)	-0.11 (0.24)	-0.15 (0.24)	0.56* (0.25)	0.54* (0.24)
Race (ref. White, non-Latino)																		
Latino	-0.72 (0.83)	-0.84 (0.84)	0.48 (0.34)	0.45 (0.35)	-0.84** (0.28)	-0.89** (0.28)	-0.19 (0.14)	-0.21 (0.14)	-0.42* (0.22)	-0.44* (0.22)	-0.28 (0.45)	-0.30 (0.46)	-0.42* (0.22)	-0.44* (0.22)	-0.28 (0.45)	-0.30 (0.46)	-0.42* (0.22)	-0.44* (0.22)
Other, non-Latino	-0.11 (1.48)	-0.30 (1.43)	-0.38 (0.49)	-0.43 (0.50)	-0.34 (0.48)	-0.42** (0.46)	-0.03 (0.29)	-0.06 (0.28)	0.08 (0.28)	0.05 (0.27)	0.32 (0.55)	0.25 (0.52)	0.08 (0.28)	0.05 (0.27)	0.32 (0.55)	0.25 (0.52)	0.08 (0.28)	0.05 (0.27)
Age	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.00)	-0.01* (0.01)	-0.01* (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01* (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Female	-1.15* (0.48)	-1.20* (0.47)	-0.01 (0.27)	-0.03 (0.27)	-0.07 (0.18)	-0.09 (0.18)	-0.03 (0.09)	-0.05 (0.09)	-0.19* (0.11)	-0.20* (0.11)	0.07 (0.26)	0.05 (0.26)	-0.19* (0.11)	-0.20* (0.11)	0.07 (0.26)	0.05 (0.26)	-0.19* (0.11)	-0.20* (0.11)
Years Home	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.03)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.01* (0.01)	0.01* (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)
Employed	0.05 (0.48)	-0.18 (0.48)	-0.10 (0.24)	-0.16 (0.25)	0.09 (0.22)	-0.01 (0.22)	0.01 (0.09)	-0.02 (0.09)	0.04 (0.16)	0.00 (0.16)	0.09 (0.24)	0.00 (0.23)	0.04 (0.16)	0.00 (0.16)	0.09 (0.24)	0.00 (0.23)	0.04 (0.16)	0.00 (0.23)
Alone	1.99* (0.79)	1.90* (0.79)	0.62 (0.47)	0.60 (0.47)	0.50 (0.39)	0.47 (0.38)	0.29 (0.19)	0.28 (0.19)	0.27 (0.30)	0.25 (0.30)	0.92 (0.47)	0.89* (0.46)	0.27 (0.30)	0.25 (0.30)	0.92 (0.47)	0.89* (0.46)	0.27 (0.30)	0.25 (0.30)

(Continued)

Table 2. Continued.

Variables	Code of the street		Legal cynicism		Social disorder		Physical disorder		Perceived Neigh. crime		Victimization risk	
	Model 1a	Model 2a	Model 1b	Model 2b	Model 1c	Model 2c	Model 1d	Model 2d	Model 1e	Model 2e	Model 1f	Model 2f
	b (SE)	b (SE)	b (SE)	b (SE)	b (SE)	b (SE)	b (SE)	b (SE)	b (SE)	b (SE)	b (SE)	b (SE)
Border Crossing	−0.03 (0.62)	0.01 (0.60)	0.01 (0.27)	0.02 (0.26)	0.74** (0.24)	0.76** (0.23)	0.20+ (0.11)	0.20+ (0.11)	0.38* (0.19)	0.39* (0.18)	0.57 (0.20)	0.58** (0.20)
Constant	24.44***	27.83***	11.24***	12.17***	14.31***	15.77	5.00***	5.46	10.55***	11.08***	−1.52+	−0.41
Rsquared	0.05	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.08	0.10	0.05	0.06	0.05	0.05
AIC	6390.49	6375.74	5168.66	5166.05	4933.59	4921.11	3700.76	3697.37	4257.07	4255.16	493.34	487.88

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Standard errors, in parentheses, adjust for clustering at the neighborhood level

Note: outcomes A–E are OLS regression; F is logistic regression.




Figure 1. The non-linear influence of disadvantage on code of the street.




Figure 2. The non-linear influence of disadvantage on legal cynicism.

Taken together, these figures support our expectations for a positive-decelerating functional form of disadvantage on our six outcomes. The area of the relationship in which the risk is significant (up to the 5th decile for most outcomes) is where at least half of our sample lives. But just as important, for the other half of the sample, the risk of adopting perceptions that align with code of the street or legal cynicism, and disordered and unsafe community conditions as well as victimization risk begin to level off with additional increases in disadvantage.

Table 4 provides additional models to assess the robustness of these nonlinear relationships to two specifications. First, models 3 (A–F) adjust for the immigration




Figure 3. The non-linear influence of disadvantage on perceptions of social disorder.




Figure 4. The non-linear influence of disadvantage on perceptions of physical disorder.

index, which is highly correlated with disadvantage and percent Latino in our sample. Despite high correlations, controlling for immigration does little to change the substantive conclusions from our models: the relationship between disadvantage and resident outcomes takes on a positive and decelerating functional form. Model 4 (A–F) introduces percent Latino, which is also highly correlated with disadvantage and immigration. Results are less robust to controls for percent Latino. Specifically, for half of our outcomes—legal cynicism, perceived neighborhood crime and victimization risk—neither the linear nor the squared terms remain




Figure 5. The non-linear influence of disadvantage on perceptions of neighborhood crime.




Figure 6. The non-linear influence of disadvantage on victimization risk.

Table 3. Deciles for components of disadvantage (N=46).

	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	6th	7th	8th	9th	10th
% Poverty	5.81	11.54	12.86	16.17	22.87	27.15	26.55	34.10	37.91	55.18
% Fem Headed Hhlds.	11.09	13.70	18.80	18.93	21.27	16.64	23.52	23.94	26.63	25.64
% Jobless	31.87	30.71	28.02	32.38	34.81	39.13	37.64	42.03	45.96	47.58
% Profess. and Managers	52.44	36.60	32.47	30.71	30.92	24.27	18.72	18.65	17.04	9.13
% Secondary sector emp.	10.05	16.06	18.00	16.50	21.72	23.49	25.23	24.57	26.98	42.03
% High School Graduates	94.02	86.90	86.78	85.07	79.58	71.74	64.64	58.64	56.52	39.57

Table 4. Quadratic neighborhood disadvantage, immigrant concentration, and % Latino on resident's perceptions of and experiences with neighborhood crime and safety ($N=938$).

Variables	Code of the street		Legal cynicism		Social disorder		Physical disorder		Perceived Neigh. crime		Victimization risk	
	Model 3a	Model 4a	Model 3b	Model 4b	Model 3c	Model 4c	Model 3d	Model 4d	Model 3e	Model 4e	Model 3f	Model 4f
	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b
	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)
Neighborhood Level												
Neighborhood Disadvantage	2.30*** (0.51)	1.87** (0.53)	1.07** (0.31)	0.29 (0.38)	0.93*** (0.16)	0.64** (0.23)	0.34*** (0.09)	0.32*** (0.09)	0.26+ (0.13)	0.12 (0.18)	0.50+ (0.28)	0.38 (0.48)
Neigh. Dis. squared	-1.12** (0.43)	-1.15* (0.47)	-0.29+ (0.16)	-0.09 (0.21)	-0.49*** (0.11)	-0.41** (0.14)	-0.16** (0.05)	-0.15** (0.05)	-0.20* (0.08)	-0.11 (0.08)	-0.48* (0.21)	-0.49 (0.31)
Residential Stability Index	0.09 (0.33)	0.03 (0.32)	-0.28 (0.19)	-0.20 (0.18)	0.41** (0.13)	0.44** (0.13)	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.06)	0.05 (0.13)	0.10 (0.13)	-0.10 (0.26)	-0.11 (0.26)
Percent Males Aged 15-34	-0.14 (0.11)	0.14 (0.11)	0.02 (0.06)	0.04 (0.06)	-0.18** (0.04)	-0.17*** (0.04)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.10+ (0.06)	-0.10+ (0.06)
Immigrant Concentration	-0.51 (0.41)	...	-0.26 (0.26)	...	-0.09 (0.17)	...	0.02 (0.08)	...	0.07 (0.17)	...	-0.13 (0.26)	...
% Latino	...	0.00 (0.03)	...	0.04+ (0.02)	...	0.01 (0.01)	...	0.00 (0.00)	...	0.01 (0.01)	...	0.00 (0.03)
Individual Level												
Generation (ref. Third Gen.)												
First Gen	-0.27 (0.74)	-0.33 (0.73)	-0.25 (0.34)	-0.28 (0.35)	0.04 (0.32)	-0.02 (0.31)	0.22 (0.15)	0.22 (0.15)	-0.06 (0.19)	-0.06 (0.19)	-0.72* (0.37)	-0.74* (0.36)
Second Gen	0.43 (0.64)	0.39 (0.65)	0.04 (0.36)	0.01 (0.36)	0.64+ (0.33)	0.63+ (0.32)	0.42* (0.16)	0.42* (0.16)	0.53* (0.25)	0.53 (0.24)	-0.14 (0.25)	-0.15 (0.25)
Race (ref. White, non-Latino)												
Latino	-0.86 (0.84)	-0.85 (0.86)	0.43 (0.35)	0.35 (0.34)	-0.89** (0.28)	-0.92** (0.28)	-0.21 (0.14)	-0.21 (0.15)	-0.44+ (0.22)	-0.47+ (0.23)	-0.31 (0.45)	-0.30 (0.46)
Other, non-Latino	-0.31 (1.46)	-0.29 (1.43)	-0.44 (0.49)	-0.41 (0.50)	-0.43 (0.46)	-0.41 (0.47)	-0.06 (0.28)	-0.06 (0.28)	0.06 (0.27)	0.06 (0.27)	0.26 (0.52)	0.25 (0.51)
Age	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.00)	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Female	-1.21* (0.48)	-1.19* (0.47)	-0.03 (0.28)	-0.02 (0.28)	-0.09 (0.18)	-0.08 (0.18)	-0.04 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.09)	-0.20+ (0.11)	-0.20+ (0.11)	0.05 (0.26)	0.05 (0.26)
<i>(Continued)</i>												

(Continued)

Table 4. Continued.

Variables	Code of the street		Legal cynicism		Social disorder		Physical disorder		Perceived Neigh. crime		Victimization risk	
	Model 3a		Model 3b		Model 3c		Model 3d		Model 3e		Model 3f	
	b	(SE)	b	(SE)	b	(SE)	b	(SE)	b	(SE)	b	(SE)
Years Home	-0.04	(0.03)	0.01	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)	0.01 ⁺	(0.01)	0.02 ⁺	(0.01)	0.00	(0.01)
Employed	-0.19	(0.17)	-0.13	(0.25)	-0.01	(0.22)	-0.02	(0.09)	0.01	(0.16)	0.00	(0.23)
Alone	2.03*	(0.48)	0.67	(0.48)	0.49	(0.39)	0.27	(0.19)	0.24	(0.30)	0.91 ⁺	(0.23)
	1.89*	(0.80)	0.51	(0.48)	0.49	(0.39)	0.27	(0.19)	0.22	(0.30)	0.88 ⁺	(0.46)
Border Crossing	0.02	(0.61)	0.03	(0.26)	0.76**	(0.23)	0.20 ⁺	(0.11)	0.39*	(0.18)	0.58**	(0.20)
Constant	27.90***	(27.49***)	12.21***	(8.60***)	15.78***	(14.40***)	5.45***	(5.23***)	11.07***	(9.93***)	-0.44	(-0.49)
Rsquared	0.07		0.05		0.10		0.06		0.05		...	
AIC	6376.52		5166.85		4922.94		3699.35		4256.96		489.63	
	6377.72		5162.64		4922.08		3699.29		4255.71		489.88	

⁺ $p < .10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: Standard errors adjust for clustering at the neighborhood level; Outcomes A–E are OLS regression; F is logistic regression.

significant after accounting for Latino neighborhood composition. In all six versions of model 4, the VIFs for disadvantage and percent Latino are well above 4, indicating multicollinearity, and cautioning against adding in percent Latino as a standalone control variable.

Given the strong associations among socioeconomic disadvantage, percent Latino, and immigration, we explore the functional form of a ten-item index that captures Latino immigrant disadvantage (see Table 5). For five of the six dependent variables, the coefficient for the linear measure of Latino immigrant disadvantage is statistically significant ($p < 0.05$) and positive. As an example, a one unit increase in Latino immigrant disadvantage increases respondent's adherence to the code of the street by 1.72 points. Indeed, for three outcomes (code of the street, perceptions of physical disorder, and perceptions of neighborhood crime), the disadvantage index is the only statistically significant ($p < 0.05$) contextual predictor. The coefficient for Latino immigrant disadvantage on violent victimization is positive, as expected, but does not reach traditional levels of significance.

Model 2 (A–F) in Table 5 assesses whether the relationship between Latino immigrant disadvantage is nonlinear by introducing a quadratic term. For five of our six outcomes (code of the street, perceptions of social and physical disorder, perceptions of neighborhood crime and victimization risk), we find strong support for a positive but decelerating functional form in which the influence of Latino immigrant disadvantage begins to wane at higher levels. For legal cynicism, the curvilinear relationship is marginally significant ($p < 0.10$). Overall, with some caveats, these additional analyses documented in Tables 4 and 5 support findings of nonlinearity despite the challenge of empirically disentangling disadvantage and racialized immigration in El Paso.

As an alternative way to specify disadvantage's nonlinear association, we test for the statistical interaction between disadvantage and Latino immigrant concentration in Table 6. (For these analyses, we use the same measure of disadvantage used in Tables 2–4, which is decoupled from Latino immigration). We also compute the marginal effect of disadvantage at varying levels of Latino immigrant concentration to determine the sign and significance of the slope. The product term is significant and negative for five of our six outcomes (see Table 6, Model 2). Latino immigrant concentration *undercuts* the deleterious influence of disadvantage on five outcomes; the statistical interaction predicting perceptions of legal cynicism is marginally significant.

We visualize these significant interactions with Figures 7–11. To ease interpretation, we plot the influence of socioeconomic disadvantage (5th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 95th percentiles) on our outcomes at three levels of Latino immigrant concentration: the 25th (low), 50th (medium), and 75th (high) percentiles. These figures show that when residents live in Latino immigrant concentrated neighborhoods, the influence of disadvantage is less damaging compared to their counterparts living in disadvantaged places but with fewer Latinos and immigrants. As one example, though Figure 7 shows that living in disadvantaged communities increases adherence to the code of the street, this association lessens by about half for those in neighborhoods with high levels of Latino immigrant concentration (i.e. at least

Table 5. Latino immigrant disadvantage (linear and quadratic) on resident perceptions of and experiences with neighborhood crime and safety ($N=938$).

Variables	Code of the street			Legal cynicism			Social disorder			Physical disorder			Perceived Neigh. crime			Victimization risk		
	Model 1a	Model 2a	(SE)	Model 1b	Model 2b	(SE)	Model 1c	Model 2c	(SE)	Model 1d	Model 2d	(SE)	Model 1e	Model 2e	(SE)	Model 1f	Model 2f	(SE)
Neighborhood Level																		
Latino Immigrant Disadvantage	1.72*** (0.45)	1.82*** (0.40)		0.83*** (0.22)	0.87*** (0.21)		0.81*** (0.17)	0.86*** (0.14)		0.34*** (0.07)	0.36*** (0.06)		0.31* (0.12)	0.33** (0.12)		0.30 (0.18)	0.39+ (0.21)	
Latino Imm. Dis. Squared	...	-1.11* (0.45)		...	-0.33+ (0.20)		...	-0.56*** (0.13)		...	-0.15* (0.06)		...	-0.21* (0.08)		...	-0.66** (0.27)	
Residential Stability Index	-0.35 (0.41)	0.04 (0.34)		-0.42** (0.20)	-0.30 (0.20)		0.23 (0.14)	0.43* (0.14)		-0.07 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.06)		0.01 (0.12)	0.07 (0.13)		-0.25 (0.24)	-0.05 (0.27)	
Percent Males Aged 15-34	0.00 (0.11)	-0.09 (0.12)		0.06 (0.06)	0.04 (0.06)		-0.12* (0.05)	-0.16** (0.04)		0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)		-0.03 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)		-0.06 (0.05)	-0.10+ (0.06)	
Individual Level																		
Generation (ref Third Gen.)																		
First Gen	-0.29 (0.75)	-0.29 (0.73)		-0.28 (0.34)	-0.28 (0.35)		0.04 (0.33)	0.04 (0.31)		0.22 (0.15)	0.22 (0.15)		-0.05 (0.19)	-0.06 (0.19)		-0.74* (0.37)	-0.71+ (0.36)	
Second Gen	0.50 (0.68)	0.44 (0.66)		0.05 (0.37)	0.03 (0.37)		0.68 (0.34)	0.64 (0.33)		0.44* (0.16)	0.43* (0.16)		0.55* (0.25)	0.54* (0.25)		-0.11 (0.24)	-0.12 (0.25)	
Race (ref. White, non-Latino)																		
Latino	-0.65 (0.84)	-0.77 (0.85)		0.50 (0.34)	0.47 (0.34)		-0.82** (0.29)	-0.88** (0.29)		-0.19 (0.15)	-0.20 (0.15)		-0.43+ (0.22)	-0.45+ (0.23)		-0.26 (0.45)	-0.31 (0.46)	
Other, non-Latino	-0.11 (1.45)	-0.23 (1.41)		-0.38 (0.50)	-0.41 (0.50)		-0.40 (0.48)	-0.40 (0.47)		-0.03 (0.29)	-0.05 (0.29)		0.09 (0.28)	0.06 (0.27)		0.31 (0.55)	0.22 (0.52)	
Age	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)		-0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)		-0.02** (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)		-0.01+ (0.00)	-0.01 (0.00)		-0.01* (0.01)	-0.02+ (0.01)		-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	
Female	-1.11* (0.49)	-1.16* (0.48)		0.00* (0.27)	-0.10 (0.27)		-0.05 (0.18)	-0.08 (0.18)		-0.03 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.09)		-0.19+ (0.11)	-0.20* (0.11)		0.08 (0.26)	0.05 (0.25)	
Years Home	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)		0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)		0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)		0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)		0.02 (0.01)	0.02+ (0.01)		0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	
Employed	0.06 (0.48)	-0.12 (0.48)		-0.10 (0.24)	-0.15 (0.25)		0.09 (0.22)	0.01 (0.22)		-0.01 (0.09)	-0.01 (0.09)		0.04 (0.16)	0.01 (0.16)		0.09 (0.23)	0.00 (0.23)	
Alone	1.85* (0.80)	1.74* (0.80)		0.56 (0.47)	0.52 (0.47)		0.43 (0.39)	0.38 (0.39)		0.26 (0.20)	0.24 (0.19)		0.24 (0.30)	0.22 (0.30)		0.91+ (0.46)	0.86+ (0.47)	

(Continued)

Table 5. Continued.

Variables	Code of the street		Legal cynicism		Social disorder		Physical disorder		Perceived Neigh. crime		Victimization risk	
	Model 1a	Model 2a	Model 1b	Model 2b	Model 1c	Model 2c	Model 1d	Model 2d	Model 1e	Model 2e	Model 1f	Model 2f
	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b
	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)
Border Crossing	-0.03 (0.62)	0.01 (0.61)	0.01 (0.27)	0.03 (0.26)	0.74** (0.24)	0.76** (0.23)	0.19+ (0.11)	0.20+ (0.11)	0.38* (0.18)	0.39* (0.18)	0.57*** (0.20)	0.58** (0.20)
Constant	24.38***	26.72***	11.20***	11.91***	14.27***	15.46***	4.98***	5.29***	10.52***	10.98***	-1.51+	-0.30
R squared	0.04	0.06	0.04	0.05	0.08	0.10	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
AIC	6394.36	6385.28	5170.75	5169.09	4935.24	4923.79	3701.34	3699.92	4256.45	4254.43	493.81	486.34

+ $p < .10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Standard errors adjust for clustering at the neighborhood level

Note: Outcomes A–E are OLS regression; F is logistic regression.

Table 6. Interaction between neighborhood disadvantage and Latino immigration concentration on resident perceptions of and experiences with neighborhood crime and safety ($N = 938$).

Variables	Code of the Street		Legal Cynicism		Social Disorder		Physical Disorder		Perceived Neigh. Crime		Victimization Risk	
	Model 1a	Model 2a	Model 1b	Model 2b	Model 1c	Model 2c	Model 1d	Model 2d	Model 1e	Model 2e	Model 1f	Model 2f
	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b
	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)
Neighborhood Level												
Neighborhood Disadvantage	2.09** (0.75)	2.47*** (0.60)	0.88* (0.39)	1.00** (0.38)	0.78** (0.24)	0.97*** (0.23)	0.31** (0.11)	0.35 (0.12)	0.17 (0.15)	0.24 (0.15)	0.41 (0.31)	0.52+ (0.30)
Latino Immigrant Concentration	-0.42 (0.60)	-0.71 (0.48)	-0.07 (0.32)	-0.16 (0.30)	0.01 (0.23)	-0.13 (0.21)	0.04 (0.09)	0.00 (0.10)	0.14 (0.18)	0.09 (0.19)	-0.13 (0.37)	-0.14 (0.31)
Disadvantage X Lat. Imm. Concentration	...	-1.17** (0.42)	...	-0.37+ (0.21)	.	-0.58*** (0.12)	...	-0.13* (0.06)	...	-0.22* (0.08)	...	-0.67* (0.27)
Residential Stability Index	-0.37 (0.46)	0.00 (0.37)	-0.42* (0.20)	-0.31 (0.19)	0.23 (0.15)	0.41** (0.14)	-0.07 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.12)	0.06 (0.13)	-0.26 (0.24)	-0.06 (0.27)
Percent Males Aged 15–34	0.00 (0.11)	-0.08 (0.10)	0.06 (0.06)	0.03 (0.06)	-0.12* (0.05)	-0.16* (0.04)	0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.05* (0.04)	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.09+ (0.06)
Individual Level												
Generation (ref. Third Gen.)												
First Gen	-0.24 (0.75)	-0.21 (0.74)	-0.26 (0.34)	-0.25 (0.34)	0.05 (0.33)	0.07 (0.31)	0.23 (0.15)	0.23 (0.15)	-0.05 (0.19)	-0.05 (0.19)	-0.73* (0.37)	-0.70 (0.37)
Second Gen	0.55 (0.66)	0.52 (0.64)	0.06 (0.36)	0.06 (0.36)	0.69+ (0.33)	0.68+ (0.33)	0.44* (0.16)	0.44** (0.16)	0.55* (0.25)	0.55* (0.25)	-0.10 (0.24)	-0.09 (0.25)
Race (ref. White, non-Latino)												
Latino	-0.72 (0.82)	-0.85 (0.83)	0.48 (0.35)	0.44 (0.35)	-0.84** (0.28)	-0.90** (0.28)	-0.19 (0.14)	-0.21 (0.14)	-0.42+ (0.22)	-0.45+ (0.23)	-0.28 (0.45)	-0.32 (0.46)
Other, non-Latino	-0.12 (1.51)	-0.25 (1.47)	-0.38 (0.49)	-0.42 (0.49)	-0.34 (0.48)	-0.41 (0.46)	-0.03 (0.29)	-0.05 (0.28)	0.09 (0.28)	0.06 (0.27)	0.33 (0.55)	0.25 (0.52)
Age	.01 (0.02)	.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.01+ (0.00)	-0.01 (0.00)	-0.01* (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Female	-1.16* (0.48)	-1.21* (0.47)	-0.01 (0.28)	-0.03 (0.28)	-0.07 (0.18)	-0.09 (0.18)	-0.03 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.09)	-0.19+ (0.11)	-0.20+ (0.11)	0.07 (0.26)	0.05 (0.25)
Years Home	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.03)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02+ (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.01+ (0.01)	0.01+ (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)

(Continued)

Table 6. Continued.

Variables	Code of the Street		Legal Cynicism		Social Disorder		Physical Disorder		Perceived Neigh. Crime		Victimization Risk	
	Model 1a	Model 2a	Model 1b	Model 2b	Model 1c	Model 2c	Model 1d	Model 2d	Model 1e	Model 2e	Model 1f	Model 2f
	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b
	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)
Employed	.03 (.48)	−0.15 (.48)	−0.10 (.24)	−0.16 (.26)	0.09 (.22)	0.00 (.22)	0.01 (.09)	−0.01 (.09)	0.04 (.16)	0.01 (.16)	0.08 (.24)	−0.01 (.23)
Alone	2.08* (.76)	2.01* (.78)	0.64 (.48)	0.62 (.48)	0.50 (.40)	0.46 (.39)	0.28 (.19)	0.27 (.19)	0.24 (.31)	0.22 (.31)	0.94* (.46)	0.90 (.47)
Border Crossing	−0.01 (.61)	0.04 (.61)	0.02 (.27)	0.03 (.27)	0.74** (.24)	0.77** (.23)	0.19+ (.11)	0.20+ (.11)	0.38* (.19)	0.39* (.19)	0.57** (.20)	0.58** (.20)
Constant	24.51*** (.05)	26.79*** (.06)	11.25 (.05)	11.98*** (.05)	14.31*** (.08)	15.45*** (.10)	4.99*** (.05)	5.25*** (.05)	10.52*** (.05)	10.93*** (.05)	−1.51+ (.20)	−0.45 (.20)
R squared	0.05	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.08	0.10	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
AIC	6391.88	6382.00	5170.60	5168.22	4935.58	4923.51	3702.69	3701.92	4258.446	4256.70	495.17	487.44

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Robust standard errors adjust for clustering at the neighborhood level

Note: outcomes A–E are OLS regression; F is logistic regression.




Figure 7. The influence of neighborhood disadvantage on adherence to the code of the street at varying levels of Latino immigrant concentration.




Figure 8. The influence of neighborhood disadvantage on perceptions of social disorder at varying levels of Latino immigrant concentration.

30% foreign born and 84% Latino). Moreover, the slope for disadvantage on respondent's perceptions of neighborhood crime (Figure 10) and the reporting of victimization (Figure 11) is not significant for those who live in communities with medium and high levels of Latino immigrant concentration (i.e. more than 15% poverty and 80% Latino). We caution, however, that it is challenging to interpret




Figure 9. The influence of neighborhood disadvantage on perceptions of physical disorder at varying levels of Latino immigrant concentration.




Figure 10. The influence of neighborhood disadvantage on perceptions of neighborhood crime at varying levels of Latino immigrant concentration.

these statistical interactions given the skewed distribution between disadvantage and Latino immigration. For example, the figures imply a different relationship between disadvantage and resident outcomes in places with fewer immigrants. Yet, there are very few disadvantaged places in El Paso that do not have high levels of Latino immigrant concentration. Nonetheless, the interaction is consistent with the argument that the reason why we find a decreasing positive slope between disadvantage and resident outcomes is that Latino immigrant




Figure 11. The influence of neighborhood disadvantage on victimization risk at varying levels of Latino immigrant concentration.

concentration helps counter some of the deleterious consequences of socioeconomic marginalization in El Paso.⁸

Conclusion

A fundamental notion in the communities and crime literature is that socioeconomic disadvantage jeopardizes a variety of neighborhood and individual level outcomes (Peterson & Krivo, 2010; Sampson et al., 2002). Scholarship tests this notion mostly at the macro level and therefore masks important heterogeneity within neighborhoods. Consequently, we know little about how residents within the same disadvantaged context respond and make sense of their surroundings. By embedding individuals within their neighborhoods, contextual studies seek to understand how residents interpret jointly experienced conditions. A handful of contextual studies investigate the contextual underpinnings of residents' espousal of the code of the street, legal cynicism perceptions of neighborhood disorder or crime, and experiences with victimization (i.e. Curry et al., 2025; Kirk et al., 2012; Kirk & Papachristos, 2017;

⁸Additional assessments indicate that taking nonlinearities into consideration improves model fit for most outcomes we examine. Comparing models 1 (A–F) to models 2 (A–F) in Table 2 reveals that the AIC statistics are smaller and this difference is statistically smaller based on likelihood ratio tests, indicating that the nonlinear models provide a better fit ($p < 0.05$). We find generally the same results when assessing nonlinearities for Latino immigrant disadvantage (models 1 v 2 in Table 5) except that model comparisons for legal cynicism and physical disorder are marginally significant. Moreover, models improve based on the AIC statistics when the interaction term is included in Table 6 for all outcomes except for perceptions of physical disorder and perceived neighborhood crime. Models for likelihood ratio tests, per Stata requirements, do not include adjustments for the clustering of level 1 units (StataCorp, 2023).

Stewart & Simons, 2010). To our knowledge, however, no contextual study has assessed the functional form of this relationship. By implication, studies assume a simple, linear association between disadvantage and resident outcomes whereby disadvantage operates in a consistent manner across its distribution (i.e. Bellair et al., 2024; Bellair & McNulty, 2005). Given their disproportionate experience with socioeconomic disadvantage, prevailing accounts also expect that residents from non-White communities are particularly vulnerable to pernicious consequences (Almeida et al., 2009; Sampson et al., 1997). We suggest the immigrant revitalization thesis, which explores how Latino immigrant concentration may dampen the negative consequences of disadvantage, implies a more nuanced, curvilinear association between concentrated Latino disadvantage and resident's perceptions of and experiences with crime and safety. Specifically, residing in segregated and disadvantaged Latino immigrant neighborhoods may provide resiliencies despite the toll of marginalization (Lee & Martinez, 2002; Martinez, 2014). Informed by research on the ways segregated immigrant communities organize despite economic exclusion, we posit, first, a positive yet decelerating relationship in which the toll of disadvantage begins to abate at high levels, and second, a statistical interaction whereby Latino immigration moderates the influence of disadvantage on the six resident outcomes we examine.

Focusing on a predominantly Latino city with a sizeable immigrant population, we explore these hypotheses with community survey data from the El Paso Neighborhood Study. As expected, we find that disadvantage increases the presence of residents' adherence to the code of the street and legal cynicism, perceptions of two types of disorder and neighborhood crime, as well as victimization risk. However, we demonstrate that the relationship is nonlinear with a positive and decelerating functional form whereby the influence of disadvantage tapers off at high levels for our six outcomes. Furthermore, moderation analyses show that for five of our six outcomes, Latino immigration moderates the negative consequences of residence in disadvantaged areas. Similar results across alternative modeling strategies give us confidence in our interpretation that a non-linear association exists between disadvantage and resident perceptions of and experiences with neighborhood crime and safety. To make sense of these nonlinear relationships, we rely heavily on the idea of a revived urbanism in Latino immigrant-concentrated communities, such as vibrant street life and robust organizations, that indicate resiliencies residents can draw upon to reframe their communities more positively. They "see" their neighborhoods more favorably despite living in an area with concentrated disadvantage.

Our findings underscore the importance of appreciating the heterogeneous experiences of poor, minority communities in the US in two key ways. First, the tendency in most urban scholarship is to emphasize the deficits of poor, minority communities, highlighting their social disorganization and criminal opportunity structures (Duck, 2015). Our findings suggest the association between disadvantage and resident outcomes is more complex than previous research has implied. We suggest that a more nuanced (positive yet decelerating) association, as well as the ability of immigration to mitigate the consequences of disadvantage for residents, is consistent with arguments that caution against painting poor and segregated communities as disorganized (Duck, 2015; Pattillo, 1998; Small, 2002). We contend that our findings align with work

in the immigrant revitalization perspective, which has shown how immigrant communities can develop resilient forms of social capital despite high levels of economic marginalization (Aranda et al., 2011; Curry et al., 2025; Sandoval 2021; Sandoval and Herrera 2015; Sandoval-Strausz, 2019). This resilience in the face of disadvantage means that many poor, immigrant communities have less crime and other deleterious outcomes than we would expect. Applied to resident outcomes related to perceptions of and experiences with crime and safety, we ascertain that the immigrant revitalization thesis implies the kinds of positive yet decelerating associations that we uncover here. Our research suggests the need to further explore nonlinearities in the communities and crime research. The immigrant revitalization thesis implies a nonlinear association between disadvantage and various outcomes in places with more immigrants. In segregated contexts especially, assuming that disadvantage exacts a uniform risk for residents across the distribution misses the potential for processes such as revitalization. Exploring non-linear associations can be a fruitful strategy for developing theory and research. Our work thus urges urban scholarship to appreciate the subtleties and different forms of community social organization in poor minority communities. Doing so should broaden conceptualizations and guard against overlooking ways that residents resist or navigate the harsh structural realities of living in a disadvantaged community.

Second, the field's heavy reliance on rustbelt cities and their Black communities to understand disadvantaged communities may limit generalizability (Peterson & Krivo, 2010). Wilson's (1987, 1996) foundational work brought into sharp relief the role of economic restructuring and the exodus of the middle class in producing the plight of poor inner-city Black communities, especially those in the South Side of Chicago. These dramatic structural upheavals left in their wake socially isolated Black communities that faced disinvestment. As a result, Wilson argued that disadvantaged communities were largely bereft of social organization and social capital. But does this portrait of disadvantaged communities make sense for Latino immigrant areas? As Small (2007) has pointed out, there are perils associated with assuming that disadvantaged neighborhoods in Chicago typify those found in other cities. We take a step in exploring disadvantaged communities outside of Chicago by focusing on El Paso, a border city with vibrant barrios and where socioeconomic conditions correlate strongly with immigrant concentration. El Paso offered an opportunity to begin mapping out the potential these places have for partly offsetting the costs associated with marginalization. We encourage researchers to continue studying resident life in neighborhoods outside Chicago and thereby build out a more nuanced understanding of why and how neighborhoods matter.

Our main findings indicate that the associations between disadvantage and resident experiences and perceptions are more complex than some previous work has implied (Wilson, 1987, 1996). Latino immigration may help to reduce the consequences of living in such neighborhoods for residents' perceptions of and experiences with safety. Our findings may help explain the well-established association of immigration and less crime: residents in poor, immigrant dense communities seem less vulnerable and perhaps even resistant to negative frames such as code of the street, legal cynicism, seeing crime and disorder, as well as victimization risk.

Our assessment of these ideas, however, remains relatively preliminary, for at least two broad reasons. First, much like other contextual studies, the cross-sectional nature of our data precludes our ability to go beyond general associations. Investing in data collection efforts that follow residents and their neighborhoods over time will lead to better understanding how and when place matters for resident outcomes. Second, consistent with the idea of a revived urbanism in Latino communities (Sandoval-Strausz, 2019), we posit that residents adopt frames rooted in resiliency to lessen the association between disadvantage and adverse outcomes. However, we are unable to measure these processes related to resiliency directly. We encourage future work to investigate the assets offered by Latino communities and the specific frameworks and strategies that inform how residents make sense of and experience their communities. An in-depth qualitative study would be particularly ideal to uncover the varied ways that residents of Latino communities make sense of their surroundings. Such research innovations would permit more concrete assessments of the mechanisms implied by the immigrant revitalization thesis and the ways that communities can organize against the costs of economic marginalization.

Our findings suggest a resiliency in poor Latino immigrant communities that stands in stark contrast to the stubborn Latino threat narrative (Chavez, 2025) linking Latino communities and their residents to disorder and social problems. Our work cautions against portraying ethnoracially and economically segregated communities as devoid of social organization. Instead, we can learn much from understanding resilience in the face of marginalization. Highlighting the potential for revival resists the tendency to pathologize segregated communities, which, in turn, allows us to shift our efforts to testing and designing policy interventions that incorporate residents (Lyons et al., 2013) and amplify resilience. This, ultimately, will improve the perceptions and experiences of neighborhood residents.

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Author contributions

Credit: **Maria Beatriz Velez**: Conceptualization, Data curation, Formal analysis, Investigation, Methodology, Software, Visualization, Writing – original draft, Writing – review & editing; **Christopher J. Lyons**: Conceptualization, Methodology, Visualization, Writing – original draft, Writing – review & editing.

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Appendix

Table A1. Mixed effects models, disadvantage (linear and quadratic) on resident's perceptions of and experiences with neighborhood crime and safety (N = 938).

Variables	Code of the street			Legal cynicism			Social disorder			Physical disorder			Perceived Neigh. crime			Victimization risk		
	Model 1a	Model 2a		Model 1b	Model 2b		Model 1c	Model 2c		Model 1d	Model 2d		Model 1e	Model 2e		Model 1f	Model 2f	
	b (SE)	b (SE)	b (SE)	b (SE)	b (SE)	b (SE)	b (SE)	b (SE)	b (SE)	b (SE)	b (SE)	b (SE)	b (SE)	b (SE)	b (SE)	b (SE)	b (SE)	
Neighborhood Level																		
Neighborhood Disadvantage	1.76*** (0.39)	1.93*** (0.36)	0.85*** (0.20)	0.89*** (0.20)	0.79*** (0.14)	0.86*** (0.14)	0.33*** (0.07)	0.35*** (0.07)	0.28** (0.10)	0.31** (0.10)	0.32+ (0.19)	0.40+ (0.21)						
Neigh. Dis. squared	...	-1.19 (0.34)	...	-0.32+ (0.19)	...	-0.51*** (0.13)	...	-0.16* (0.07)	...	-0.18* (0.09)	...	-0.49* (0.20)						
Residential Stability Index	-0.43 (0.43)	0.01 (0.40)	-0.42+ (0.22)	-0.31 (0.22)	0.22 (0.16)	0.40** (0.16)	-0.07 (0.08)	-0.02 (0.08)	0.00 (0.11)	0.06 (0.11)	-0.26 (0.21)	-0.11 (0.21)						
Percent Males Aged 15–34	.02 (0.13)	-0.14 (0.12)	0.06 (0.07)	0.02 (0.07)	-0.11* (0.05)	-0.18*** (0.05)	0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.06 (0.06)	-0.11 (0.07)						
Individual Level																		
Generation (ref. Third Gen.)																		
First Gen	-0.11 (0.67)	-0.20 (0.67)	-0.15 (0.35)	-0.17 (0.35)	0.06 (0.31)	0.03 (0.31)	0.23 (0.16)	0.22 (0.16)	-0.05 (0.22)	-0.05 (0.22)	-0.76+ (0.40)	-0.74+ (0.40)						
Second Gen	0.56 (0.60)	0.46 (0.60)	0.07 (0.31)	0.05 (0.31)	0.69* (0.28)	0.63* (0.28)	0.44** (0.14)	0.42** (0.14)	0.56** (0.19)	0.54** (0.19)	-0.12 (0.32)	-0.15 (0.32)						
Race (ref. White, non-Latino)																		
Latino	-0.87 (0.79)	-0.91 (0.78)	0.36 (0.41)	0.35 (0.41)	-0.84* (0.36)	-0.89* (0.36)	-0.19 (0.19)	-0.21 (0.19)	-0.42+ (0.25)	-0.44 (0.25)	-0.26 (0.43)	-0.29 (0.43)						
Other, non-Latino	-0.29 (1.20)	-0.36 (1.20)	-0.47 (0.63)	-0.50 (0.63)	-0.34 (0.56)	-0.42 (0.55)	-0.03 (0.29)	-0.06 (0.29)	0.07 (0.39)	0.05 (0.39)	0.30 (0.61)	0.24 (0.61)						
Age	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.01 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.00)	-0.01** (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)						
Female	-1.07* (0.48)	-1.13* (0.48)	0.00 (0.25)	-0.01 (0.25)	-0.07 (0.22)	-0.09 (0.22)	-0.03 (0.12)	-0.04 (0.12)	-0.20 (0.16)	-0.20 (0.16)	0.07 (0.27)	0.05 (0.27)						
Years Home	-0.03+ (0.02)	-0.04+ (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02+ (0.01)	0.01* (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)						

(Continued)

Table A1. Continued.

Variables	Code of the street		Legal cynicism		Social disorder		Physical disorder		Perceived Neigh. crime		Victimization risk	
	Model 1a		Model 1b		Model 1c		Model 1d		Model 1e		Model 1f	
	b	(SE)	b	(SE)	b	(SE)	b	(SE)	b	(SE)	b	(SE)
Employed	-0.03	(0.49)	-0.17	(0.25)	-0.14	(0.23)	-0.01	(0.12)	-0.01	(0.16)	0.07	(0.27)
Alone	1.91*	(0.93)	1.87*	(0.48)	0.56	(0.50)	0.45	(0.22)	0.27	(0.25)	0.97*	(0.27)
Border Crossing	-0.05	(0.52)	-0.03	(0.27)	0.01	(0.43)	0.76**	(0.43)	0.38*	(0.30)	0.60*	(0.45)
Constant	24.37***	(2.24)	27.85***	(2.30)	11.29***	(1.16)	15.77***	(0.93)	10.54***	(0.61)	-1.53	(1.19)
Variance for Level 2	1.94	(2.30)	1.08	(1.26)	0.50	(0.87)	0.00	(0.44)	0.02	(0.65)	0.17	(1.19)
Likelihood ratio test ^a	9.14**	(3.63)	8.3**	(6.33)	0.05	(0.03)	0.00	(0.00)	0.19	(0.00)	0.96	(0.08)

Robust standard errors, in parentheses, adjust for clustering at the neighborhood level

Note: outcomes A–E are OLS regression; F is logistic regression.

^aTest compares two-level to conventional single-level models* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A2. Mixed effects models, Latino immigrant disadvantage (linear and quadratic) on resident's perceptions of and experiences with neighborhood crime and safety ($N = 938$).

Variables	Code of the street		Legal cynicism		Social disorder		Physical disorder		Perceived Neigh. crime		Victimization risk	
	Model 1a	Model 2a	Model 1b	Model 2b	Model 1c	Model 2c	Model 1d	Model 2d	Model 1e	Model 2e	Model 1f	Model 2f
	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b	b
	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)	(SE)	SE	SE	SE	SE	SE	SE
Neighborhood Level												
Latino Immigrant Disadvantage	1.74*** (0.42)	1.85*** (0.40)	0.86*** (0.22)	0.88*** (0.21)	0.81*** (0.15)	0.86*** (0.15)	0.34*** (0.08)	0.36*** (0.08)	0.31** (0.11)	0.33** (0.10)	0.32 (0.21)	0.41+ (0.22)
Latino Imm. Dis. squared	...	-1.12** (0.41)	...	-0.32 (0.22)	...	-0.56*** (0.15)	...	-0.15+ (0.08)	...	-0.21* (0.11)	...	-0.66** (0.25)
Residential Stability Index	-0.41 (0.44)	-0.01 (0.44)	-0.42+ (0.22)	-0.30 (0.23)	0.23 (0.16)	0.43** (0.16)	-0.07 (0.08)	-0.02 (0.08)	-0.01 (0.11)	0.07 (0.11)	-0.26 (0.21)	-0.05 (0.21)
Percent Males Aged 15–34	0.01 (0.13)	-0.09 (0.13)	0.06 (0.07)	0.03 (0.07)	-0.11* (0.05)	-0.16*** (0.05)	0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.06 (0.06)	-0.11+ (0.06)
Individual Level												
Generation (ref. Third Gen.)												
First Gen	-0.11 (0.67)	-0.14 (0.67)	-0.16 (0.35)	-0.16 (0.35)	0.04 (0.31)	0.04 (0.31)	0.22 (0.16)	0.22 (0.16)	-0.06 (0.22)	-0.05 (0.21)	-0.76+ (0.40)	-0.72+ (0.39)
Second Gen	0.55 (0.60)	0.50 (0.60)	0.07 (0.31)	0.06 (0.31)	0.67* (0.28)	0.64* (0.28)	0.44** (0.14)	0.43** (0.14)	0.55** (0.19)	0.54** (0.19)	-0.12 (0.32)	-0.13 (0.32)
Race (ref. White, non-Latino)												
Latino	-0.84 (0.79)	-0.88 (0.79)	0.37 (0.41)	0.36 (0.41)	-0.82* (0.36)	-0.88* (0.36)	-0.19 (0.19)	-0.20 (0.19)	-0.42 (0.25)	-0.45+ (0.25)	-0.25 (0.43)	-0.29 (0.43)
Other, non-Latino	-0.30 (1.20)	-0.34 (1.20)	-0.47 (0.63)	-0.49 (0.63)	-0.35 (0.56)	-0.40 (0.55)	-0.03 (0.29)	-0.05 (0.29)	0.08 (0.39)	0.06 (0.39)	0.29 (0.61)	0.22 (0.61)
Age	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.00)	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Female	-1.06* (0.49)	-1.10* (0.48)	0.01 (0.25)	0.00 (0.25)	-0.06 (0.23)	-0.08 (0.22)	-0.03 (0.12)	-0.04 (0.12)	-0.19 (0.16)	-0.20 (0.16)	0.08 (0.27)	0.05 (0.27)
Years Home	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.02+ (0.01)	0.01* (0.01)	0.01* (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Employed	-0.03 (0.49)	-0.13 (0.49)	-0.14 (0.25)	-0.17 (0.25)	0.09 (0.23)	0.01 (0.23)	0.01 (0.12)	-0.02 (0.12)	0.04 (0.16)	-0.01 (0.16)	0.07 (0.27)	-0.01 (0.27)
Alone	1.83+ (0.93)	1.76+ (0.93)	0.52 (0.48)	0.50 (0.48)	0.43 (0.43)	0.38 (0.43)	0.26 (0.22)	0.24 (0.22)	0.24 (0.30)	0.22 (0.30)	0.96* (0.45)	0.89+ (0.46)

(Continued)

Table A2. Continued.

Variables	Code of the street		Legal cynicism		Social disorder		Physical disorder		Perceived Neigh. crime		Victimization risk	
	Model 1a	Model 2a	Model 1b	Model 2b	Model 1c	Model 2c	Model 1d	Model 2d	Model 1e	Model 2e	Model 1f	Model 2f
	b (SE)	b (SE)	b (SE)	b (SE)	b (SE)	b (SE)	b (SE)	b (SE)	b (SE)	b (SE)	b (SE)	b (SE)
Border Crossing	-0.05 (0.52)	-0.02 (0.52)	0.01 (0.27)	0.01 (0.27)	0.74** (0.24)	0.76** (0.24)	0.19 (0.13)	0.19 (0.13)	0.38* (0.17)	0.39* (0.17)	0.60* (0.29)	0.60* (0.29)
Constant	24.37*** (2.15)	26.79*** (2.35)	11.29*** (1.18)	11.99*** (1.25)	14.26*** (0.88)	15.46*** (0.91)	4.98*** (0.44)	5.30*** (0.47)	10.52*** (0.61)	10.98*** (0.64)	-1.52 (1.14)	-0.27 (1.19)
Variance for Level 2	2.07	1.55	0.53	0.48	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.18	0.06
Likelihood ratio test ^a	10.73***	6.51**	9.16**	7.51**	0.12	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.15	0.00	1.05	0.13

Robust standard errors, in parentheses, adjust for clustering at the neighborhood level
 Note: outcomes A-E are OLS regression; F is logistic regression.
^aTest compares two-level to conventional single-level models
 * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$, **** $p < 0.001$

Table A3. Mixed effects models, disadvantage \times Latino immigrant concentration on resident's perceptions of and experiences with neighborhood crime and safety ($N = 938$).

Variables	Code of the street		Legal cynicism		Social disorder		Physical disorder		Perceived Neigh. crime		Victimization risk	
	Model 1a		Model 1b		Model 1c		Model 1d		Model 1e		Model 1f	
	b	(SE)	b	(SE)	b	(SE)	b	(SE)	b	(SE)	b	(SE)
Neighborhood Level												
Neighborhood Disadvantage	2.47***	(0.65)	1.00**	(0.36)	.97***	(0.25)	.35**	(0.13)	.24	(0.17)	.52	(0.32)
Latino Immigrant Concentration	−0.70	(0.66)	−0.15	(0.36)	−0.13	(0.25)	0.00	(0.13)	0.09	(0.17)	−0.14	(0.33)
Disadvantage \times Lat. Imm. Con.	−1.16**	(0.41)	−0.35	(0.22)	−0.58***	(0.16)	−0.13 ⁺	(0.08)	−0.22 ⁺	(0.11)	−0.67**	(0.24)
Residential Stability Index	−0.02	(0.42)	−0.31	(0.23)	0.41*	(0.16)	0.03	(0.08)	0.06	(0.11)	−0.06	(0.21)
Percent Males Aged 15–34	−0.08	(0.12)	0.04	(0.07)	−0.16***	(0.05)	0.00	(0.02)	−0.05	(0.03)	−0.10	(0.06)
Individual Level												
Generation (ref. Third Gen.)												
First Gen	−0.11	(0.67)	−0.14	(0.35)	0.07	(0.31)	0.23	(0.16)	−0.05	(0.22)	−0.71 ⁺	(0.39)
Second Gen	.55	(0.60)	0.08	(0.31)	0.68*	(0.28)	0.44**	(0.14)	0.55**	(0.19)	−0.10	(0.32)
Race (ref. White, non-Latino)												
Latino	−0.92	(0.78)	0.34	(0.41)	−0.90*	(0.36)	−0.21	(0.19)	−0.45 ⁺	(0.25)	−0.32	(0.43)
Other, non-Latino	−0.34	(1.20)	−0.49	(0.63)	−0.41	(0.55)	−0.05	(0.29)	0.06	(0.39)	0.25	(0.61)
Age	0.02	(0.02)	0.00	(0.01)	−0.02*	(0.01)	−0.01	(0.00)	−0.02**	(0.01)	−0.01	(0.01)
Female	−1.14*	(0.48)	0.00	(0.25)	−0.09	(0.22)	−0.04	(0.12)	−0.20	(0.16)	0.04	(0.27)
Years Home	−0.04	(0.02)	0.01	(0.01)	0.02 ⁺	(0.01)	0.01 ⁺	(0.01)	0.02**	(0.01)	0.00	(0.01)
Employed	−0.14	(0.49)	−0.16	(0.25)	0.00	(0.22)	−0.01	(0.12)	−0.01	(0.16)	−0.01	(0.27)
Alone	1.95*	(0.94)	0.57	(0.49)	0.46	(0.43)	0.27	(0.23)	0.22	(0.30)	0.91*	(0.45)
Border Crossing	0.00	(0.52)	0.02	(0.27)	0.77**	(0.24)	0.20	(0.13)	0.39*	(0.17)	0.59*	(0.29)
Constant	26.74***	(2.27)	11.97***	(1.23)	15.45***	(0.90)	5.25***	(0.47)	10.93***	(0.63)	−0.47	(1.16)
Variance for Level 2	1.27		0.43		0.00		0.00		0.00		0.04	
Likelihood ratio test ^a	4.6**		6.68**		0.00		0.00		0.00		0.05	

Robust standard errors, in parentheses, adjust for clustering at the neighborhood level

Note: outcomes A–E are OLS regression; F is logistic regression.

^aTest compares two-level to conventional single-level models

⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$